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Facing demographic ageing, Germany and Austria have reformed their old age security systems to be 
sustainable for the future. With reforms starting at the turn of the century, a trend towards later retirement has 
been set by these governments. Especially interesting for governmental bodies is the question, which factors 
determine retirement after the statutory pension age. Germany and Austria promote late retirement in order to 
keep their pension systems sustainable, despite having cut the benefits of their public pension systems 
drastically since the early 2000s. Using wave 7 of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement (SHARE), this 
thesis compares Germany, Austria and a sample of all SHARE countries to determine which individual, 
occupational and institutional factors affect late retirement significantly. The results show that a key 
characteristic of determining retirement timing is age. The older a population gets, the more likely retirement 
is. This is especially true for Austria. Among German citizens, receiving public pension benefits decreases the 
odds of having income from gainful employment dramatically. Further, comparing both countries with the 
SHARE sample, a pattern for educational attainment is visible. The data shows that the odds of working in 
retirement increase significantly with a medium and high level of education. 
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Many European welfare states have undergone a policy shift from allowing and promoting the 
retirement of older workers before the statutory retirement age to minimizing incentives to retire 
early by introducing various policy measures (Hinrichs 2000; Ebbinghaus 2011b). This policy shift, 
largely taking effect in the 1980s, has been the result of changed societal circumstances. Having 
faced increased unemployment due to the oil crises in the 1970s, Austrian labor market policy 
dismissed older adults from the labor market to retire early in order to relieve pressure from the 
labor market (Obinger and Talos 2010). With an increasing share of older adults aged 50+ years in 
the populations of industrialized nations, as well as low participation rates in labor markets 
combined with low fertility rates, welfare states are challenged to reform their pension systems to 
withstand demographic ageing and be sustainable in the longer term (cf. Schmidthuber et al. 2016). 
Policies targeting this ranges from reforms such as increasing the statutory retirement age, closing 
early retirement paths and retrenching public pension benefits to active labor market policies, which 
incentivize employers to hire older workers (cf. Hofäcker and Naumann 2015). 
Traditionally, a differentiation can be made between Bismarckian and Beveridgean pension schemes 
(Ebbinghaus 2011a). Bismarckian pay-as-you-go pension schemes are usually designed to have a 
large first, public contribution-financed pension pillar with the second and third pillar only 
supplementing these state pensions (ibid.). In this case, pensioners rely on the contributions made 
by those in the work force (ibid.). In contrast, in Beveridgean systems the first pillar only provides a 
flat-rate pension to lift older citizens, who are not able to work due to various reasons, out of poverty 
(ibid.). Pensions are usually tax-financed and provide incentives to take out private insurances (ibid.). 
Thus, in the Beveridgean pension schemes, the second and third pillar are already important 
(Anderson 2015). 
Germany and Austria, two continental, Bismarckian welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 2007), are in 
a similar need to make their pension systems financially sustainable for the future. Both countries 
are working towards keeping older adults aged 50+ in the labor market as long as possible and 
guaranteeing the financial sustainability of their public pension schemes while cutting benefits, but 
with different measures (Ebbinghaus 2011a).  
Literature tells us that lower pension benefits, atypical forms of work as well as gaps between jobs 
affect income in old age (Mayrhuber et al. 2019; Möhring 2015; Bäcker 2018a; OECD 2019). Germany 
and Austria have seen an increase in the share of citizens working beyond 65 since the early 2000s 
(Eurostat 2020a, 2019). An important research gap in this regard is the question of why people retire 
late. To date, scientific literature has explored factors of retirement timing, barely focusing on those 
who work past the retirement age. Virtually no empirical evidence is found in regard to Austria. Can 
we see differences in education, sector of employment or the number of years in employment in 
those who work beyond the retirement age? The aim of this master thesis is to give a review of the 
literature looking at factors affecting retirement timing. Subsequently, it provides a descriptive 
overview the pension systems in Austria and Germany tracing pension policy and reforms in the 
past.  
Primarily, though, this study explores the role of pension levels (net replacement rate), and of 
individual (gender, education) and occupational (sector of employment) factors and how they 
influence the timing of retirement. Showing crucial similarities in their social and old age security 
system, Germany and Austria will be compared using data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement (SHARE) wave 7. SHARE provides the necessary tools to analyze all factors mentioned 
above in depth and investigate links between those factors. Separate binary logistic regression 
models will be created to highlight the importance of each factor affecting retirement timing in each 
country. Additionally, the regression models for both countries will be compared with a model for 
all SHARE participating countries. 
This paper is structured as follows: First, I give an overview of my hypotheses and previous literature 
supporting and negating my assumptions. Second, a short overview of the two pension systems and 
their reform paths will be given, resulting in a comparison of Austria and Germany. Most importantly, 
the paper will provide insight into reforms focusing on late retirement and pension system 
sustainability. Third, wave 7 of SHARE published in 2019 will be discussed. Afterwards, 
operationalized dependent and independent variables will be explained. Fifth, the method in use 
will be discussed shortly. Subsequently, results of the empirical analysis of the hypotheses are 




2. RETIREMENT TIMING 
This paper contributes to the scarce literature on retirement timing in Austria. It compares the 
influence single demographic/individual, occupational and institutional factors have on late 
retirement in Austria to their influence in Germany. Both countries have formerly shown similar 
features in their social security systems. Up to the 1990s, Austria and Germany based their pension 
old-age security system primarily on the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) public pillar, which follows the 
equivalence principle (Blank et al. 2016a). With Germany shifting to a multi-pillar pension system 
and changing the goal of the public pension pillar to poverty alleviation (Ebbinghaus et al. 2011) and 
Austria staying with a single-pillar scheme and income maintenance (Blank et al. 2016a), a 
comparison of pension levels becomes quite interesting. 
Whereas previous literature in the field of retirement timing has generally addressed these three 
separately or institutional and individual factors combined, the approach taken in this paper allows 
combining all three categories. The institutional category focuses on retirement in terms of pension 
levels and incentives to work beyond the statutory retirement age. As for the occupational level, a 
sector of employment variable will be introduced to the analysis. As will be discussed in more detail 
later, the literature suggests that sector of employment is influential in the retirement decision. The 
individual level comprises educational attainment as independent variable as well as employment 
history. Specifically, the analysis will look at years in employment throughout one’s life and 
determine if this correlates with working in retirement. 
In the past empirical research has focused on Germany and aggregated data on EU member states. 
There is no empirical evidence focusing on Austria specifically so far. In order to contribute to the 
scientific literature on retirement timing in Austria, this thesis utilizes wave 7 of SHARE, allowing 
exploring the latest data on retirement timing that is available. Logistic regression analyses will be 
used in order to investigate which factors are important in deciding to retire late. By creating 
separate regression models for Austria and Germany, the vast difference in importance of specific 
factors in both countries can be identified. Afterwards, both countries will be compared to a sample 
consisting of all SHARE participating countries. In this sense, four hypotheses regarding late 
retirement will be examined. 
Blank et al. (2016b) state that public pension retrenchment has occurred by far more drastically since 
the 1990s in Germany than it has in Austria. Germany’s government started promoting voluntary 
funded occupational and individual pension schemes at the turn of the millennium (e.g. the so-called 
Riester and the Rürup pension) and is widely seen as having been successful in reversing their early 
retirement pension scheme into a late retirement scheme (Blank et al. 2016a), although at the cost 
of citizens’ welfare (Blank et al. 2016b). This reversal has been proven to be the result of the 
cancellation of various early retirement paths, deductions from later benefits in the case of early 
retirement (ibid.) as well as an increasing statutory retirement age (Bäcker 2018b). According to 
Blank et al. (2016b), this public pension benefit retrenchment leaves behind much lower benefit 
levels especially for less educated workers, which occupational and private pension schemes cannot 
improve properly. Whereas there is a wide consensus that this shift to a multi-pillar pension scheme 
increased and still increases old-age income inequality and poverty among pensioners (Bäcker 
2018a; Blank et al. 2016a; Ebbinghaus 2018), it also decreases the level of security of current workers 
(Bridgen and Meyer 2014). Additionally, Bäcker (2018a) argues that very low income is most 
prevalent among single persons with 6% of single women and 5% of single men having an income 
lower than 700€ per month (including public, occupational and private pensions).  
Austria has reformed the pension system within the margins of the public pay-as-you-go pension 
system, keeping the focus on the first pillar (Blank et al. 2016c). Austria made a switch to defined-
benefit pension accounts starting in 2005 for those born after 1955 (Türk 2019). Crucial in this regard 
was the extension of the assessment period for the formation of the pension assessment base from 
15 to 40 and later 45 years for all citizens (Mayrhuber et al. 2019). In addition, Austria has also 
reformed other significant parts of its pension system, which include tightening criteria for the 
extension of insurance periods and increasing deductions in case of early retirement. Temporary 
disability pensions were abolished, introducing rehabilitation allowance and various activation 
measures for older adults (Türk 2019). These reforms have had a negative impact on the Austrian 
pension level, more specifically the new pensioners, who are now increasingly facing lower benefits 
(Mayrhuber et al. 2019). It is becoming ever more important to accomplish a full-time work 
biography without gaps in between jobs to keep pension benefits high (ibid.). Still, we see that the 
average public pension net replacement rate is 80% of lifetime earnings and the second and third 
pillar are seen as a sole top-up to the already high benefits (Blank et al. 2016c).  
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I hypothesize that there will be significant differences in the ‘need-factor’ of German and Austrian 
citizens, as Hofäcker and Radl (2016) coined the term. The need-factor describes the financial need 
to extend the time in the labor market. It will be significantly more necessary for German citizens 
than it will be for Austrians to work beyond retirement age as a result of different public pension 
levels (Hypothesis 1). In this analysis, pension income from all pension insurances will be 
investigated. The literature suggests that occupational and private pensions are not able to fill the 
gap in old-age income (Ebbinghaus 2018; Blank et al. 2016b) and more income inequality in old age 
can be found in countries in which private funded pension schemes are more important (Been et al. 
2017). Correspondingly, Axelrad (2018) argues that country of residence is also associated with 
retirement timing. Using multiple waves of SHARE (wave 2, 4 and 5), she finds that people in Austria 
were significantly less likely to retire late than in Germany (ibid.). This finding is in line with research 
by Börsch-Supan et al. (2009, 353) who find that the generosity of the social security and pension 
system ‘is significantly and positively associated to the retirement probability’. Exploring three waves 
of the German Ageing Survey (1996, 2002, 2011), Hofäcker and Naumann (2015, 477) find that the 
share of citizens working beyond the age of 65 has ‘almost tripled from 4.5 to 12%’, whereas no 
information on the situation in Austria is given in their paper.  
Second, and following Wiß et al. (2019), I hypothesize that there will be significant differences in the 
retirement age (after the statutory retirement age) between sectors of employment (Hypothesis 2). 
Wiß et al. (2019) make use of SHARE’s wave 3 and find that people in the service and primary sectors 
were more likely to retire later in comparison to people who worked in other sectors (e.g. industry 
and manufacturing). They analyze all 13 participating countries utilizing linear regressions (ibid.). 
Thus, they do not consider institutional factors such as the statutory retirement age or pension levels 
in their analysis.  
Similarly, De Preter et al. (2012) analyze data from wave 1 and 2 of SHARE with 11 participating 
countries to establish if older workers employed in industry and manufacturing retire earlier than 
those in the service sector. The authors applied survival analysis in order to receive information 
about correlations between retirement timing and sector of employment. Their results reveal that 
only workers in industry and in the financial sector tend to time their retirement earlier than workers 
in the service sector do (ibid.). According to De Preter et al. (2013), results regarding workers in the 
manufacturing sector were not significant, highlighting the importance of sociodemographic factors. 
In their analysis, Hofäcker and Naumann (2015) differentiate between the primary, secondary, 
tertiary and public sector and find that workers in the service and agricultural (primary and 
secondary) sector tend to work longer than those in the industrial sector in Germany.  
Lastly, I hypothesize that workers in Austria with a high level of education are more likely to retire 
after the statutory pension age than those with medium and low levels of education (Hypothesis 3). 
For Germany, I hypothesize that workers with low and high, rather than medium, levels of education 
work beyond retirement age (Hypothesis 4). For Austria and Germany, I argue that late retirement 
among higher educated workers happens voluntarily, rather than out of financial reasons, whereas 
those with low levels of education in Germany retire late due to need factors. Generally, the 
literature suggests that education is a key sociodemographic factor affecting retirement timing. 
Previous literature finds ambiguous results for the relationship between education and retirement 
timing in different countries.  
Hofäcker et al. (2016) who analyzed Germany in SHARE’s wave 1 and 2 point out that whereas higher 
educated workers work the longest, earlier retirement common among workers with lower levels of 
education might not be voluntary but often rather health-related. For those with lower levels of 
education, they argue that earlier exits are due to ‘eligibility to public pensions, which may be 
because they have accumulated necessary pension contribution years at a younger age, given their 
shorter educational history’ (ibid., 53). In contrast, workers with higher levels of education in 
England and Japan tend to retire earlier and voluntarily, which, according to Hofäcker et al. (2016), 
points to higher educated workers having more financial resources.  
Hofäcker and Naumann examined Germany specifically using the German Ageing Survey (waves 
1996, 2002 and 2011). Their study shows that higher educated workers ‘show a significantly higher 
likelihood to continue working up to or beyond the age of 65’ (Hofäcker and Naumann 2015, 477), 
which is the statutory retirement age in Germany.  
Analyzing European Union Labor Force Survey data, Hofäcker et al. (2019) state that those with lower 
levels of education in Germany retire late (at age 65+) due to financial reasons, while highly educated 
workers name intrinsic reasons for staying in the labor market longer. In her study, Scherger (2013) 
focusses on those working beyond the retirement age in Germany and England. Based on data from 
the German Ageing Study (2008), she finds a positive correlation between education and working 
beyond the statutory retirement age: Those with higher educational attainment tend to work 
beyond 65 (ibid.). Contradictory to the findings of Hofäcker et al. (2016), Scherger’s findings suggest 
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a positive correlation between education and working beyond the retirement age. Hofäcker et al. 
(2016) have analyzed the first three waves of the English Longitudinal Survey of Ageing (ELSA) for 
their results on England, whereas Scherger (2013) has examined wave 4 of the same survey.  
Comparing Germany, Denmark and Sweden based on data from Eurostat, Larsen and Pedersen 
(2017) find evidence of a u-curve in retirement timing for those aged 65 to 69: Men in Germany and 
women in Denmark with lower and higher, rather than medium, levels of education tend to 
postpone retirement. In line with my argument, they state that this ‘could be interpreted as a 
reflection of ‘necessity’ to work for the ‘low’ educated and ‘preferences’ for work in the ‘high’ 
education group’ (Larsen and Pedersen 2017, 24). This does not apply to Sweden, however, where 
participation rates among those with high or medium levels of education in this age group are 
significantly higher than of those with low levels of education (ibid.). Hank and Korbmacher (2013) 
claim that higher levels of education and retirement timing correlate positively with later retirement 
for women but not for men according to their discrete-time logistic regression results. Further and 
using waves 2, 4 and 5 of the SHARE, Axelrad (2018) suggests there is evidence that workers with 
high levels of education are less likely to retire before the statutory pension age. De Preter et al. 
(2013) complement that, finding evidence that those with secondary and tertiary education are 
significantly more likely to remain in the labor market longer than lower educated workers. Lastly, 
Pleau (2010) points out that highly educated workers in the USA are more likely to reenter the labor 
market after retirement. She explored data from the nationally representative Health and 
Retirement Study.  
 
  
3.  AUSTRIAN PENSION POLICY 
Austria has a long history of consensus-based policy making lead by the grand coalition, which 
consists of the Social Democratic (SPÖ) and the Christian Democratic Party (ÖVP). These two parties 
governed in conflict in the early days of the democracy in the early 1920s but have developed a 
cooperation based on compromises (Obinger et al. 2010) after World War II. Apart from the 
governmental parties, so-called social partners are usually included in the policy-making process, to 
give a voice to on the one hand employees (Arbeiterkammer as well as Gewerkschaftsbund) and on 
the other hand employers (Wirtschaftskammer). 
1. Social policy and pensions in the 20 th  century 
Austria has historically had a very generous pension system. During the ‘Golden Age’ of welfare 
expansion in the 50s, 60s and early 70s, the Austrian government and the social partners agreed on 
a wide range of welfare benefits such as early retirement benefits in case of unemployment as well 
as for those with long insurance records (Obinger et al. 2010).  
Under the Social Democratic administration under Bruno Kreisky in the mid-1970s, which held an 
absolute majority of votes, retirement age was fixed at 65 years of age for men and 60 years for 
women. Standard insurance could be obtained with 15 insurance years. The basis for calculating the 
monthly number of Schillings citizens would receive was the average salary from the last five years 
until retirement. With the single party government and Social Democrat absolute majority in 
parliament, Keynesian economic and social policy was implemented in Austria with low 
unemployment but mounting public debt (Obinger and Talos 2010). This showed welfare benefits at 
first mostly in labor market policy such as the reduction of working hours and the extension of 
holiday leave to four weeks in 1976 (Tálos 1981) in a strong cooperation with the social partners.  
After the second oil price shock (in the early 1980s) and mounting debt, the Kreisky administration 
introduced the first phase of welfare state retrenchment. This also led to the SPÖ losing the absolute 
majority of votes and starting a short-lived government with the right-wing Freedom Party (FPÖ).  
Under a new coalition between SPÖ and the People’s Party (ÖVP), moderate and balanced reforms 
were enacted, such as raising contributions for pension insurance and still facilitating early 
retirement in case of unemployment and invalidity (Obinger et al. 2010). The social partners could 
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prevent more drastic retrenchment measures (ibid.). As a sign of consensus-based politics and social 
partnership, the Grand Coalition worked to tackle economic as well as demographic challenges and 
still upheld comparatively generous benefits for their citizens. With their watered-down reforms, 
the government was able to reduce public debt and enter the European Union. In the long term, 
though, Austria was not prepared for demographic ageing and the burden it would exact on the state 
budget.  
2. Radical reforms in Austria at the turn of the century  
The turn of the century marked a radical change in power as SPÖ and ÖVP lost a significant number 
of votes in the 1999 elections, which led to a coalition between the ÖVP and FPÖ (2000 – 2006). This 
coalition neglected the social partnership, did not negotiate reforms with the social partners and, in 
doing so, changed the policy-making process drastically. This period was marked by a strict focus on 
supply-side oriented economic policy and putting the welfare state and the welfare of citizens in 
second place.  
The new government adopted neo-liberal measures and set out to push through their agenda 
without considering the long-lived tradition of cooperation with social partners. According to 
Obinger et al. (2010, 53f) the new government changed the political game by reducing the number 
of labor representatives in the Federation of Social Insurance. Before, there was imbalance in the 
representation of capital and labor with more representatives representing labor and less 
representing capital. Now, the representation of labor and capital was balanced (Obinger et al. 2010, 
53f). The FPÖ-ÖVP coalition also removed the social-democratic president of the Federation of Social 
Insurance. 
The most striking reforms happened in the field of pension policy in 2003 and 2004 with the general 
pensions act (Allgemeines Pensionsgesetz, APG) and the personal pension account. Both reforms 
extended the period for benefit calculation first to 40 years and then to 45 years of work, which 
would result in a fixed ‘benefit level of 80% of previous average earnings for a person retiring at the 
age of 65 with a 45-year employment record’ (Paster 2014, 978). A cap on losses of 10% was applied 
(ibid.). Obinger and Tálos (2006) explain that, without this cap on losses, enforced by the already 
neglected social partners representing employees, ‘the reform would have caused benefit losses of 
up to 30%’ (cited in Paster 2014, 978). Another compensation measure allowed citizens with long 
periods of work (more than 45 years) to still be able to retire early without deductions (Obinger et 
al. 2010). Furthermore, the contribution rate for the self-employed was raised to 17.5% (Knell et al. 
2006). Most importantly, with the personal pension account the calculation and organization of the 
public pension pillar was changed. The new personal pension account (Pensionskonto) replaced the 
old way of calculating later pension benefits under the above-mentioned new criteria (the 80/45/65 
rule) and was limited to new credited periods after 1.1.2005. This made the calculation of pension 
benefits in fact even more difficult, since a parallel calculation was needed for credited periods 
before and after the new law took effect (Redl et al. 2015). 
3. Latest policy changes  
After the FPÖ-ÖVP coalition, another Grand Coalition came into power again. The new SPÖ-ÖVP 
coalition introduced a means-tested basic income and a minimum wage. Pension benefits were 
raised again and improvements in social protection were made for citizens in new forms of 
employment, for instance quasi-freelancers (Bundeskanzleramt 2007). 
In 2016 it was decided to let the path of early retirement on grounds of long insurance record 
(Langzeitversichertenpension) expire in 2017 (Federal Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and 
Consumer Protection 2016). Until then, eligibility criteria were tightened, which gradually increased 
the age of earliest possible retirement for women from 57 to 62 and men from 60 to 62 (ibid.). 
Regarding the personal pension account, credited periods before 2005 were converted to become a 
starting credit in the pension accounts for all as of 2014. This was meant to make pension calculation 
easier and transparent for the population.   
Eligibility criteria for invalidity pensions have also been tightened. The temporary invalidity pension 
retirement path has expired and has been replaced with the right to funding for rehabilitation 
measures. The indefinite invalidity pension, though, remains. 
4. Status quo 2020 
At present, the pension system in Austria is following the General Pensions Act using a personal 
pension account. The Austrian public pension system provides two distinct groups of pension 
benefits: Own pensions and survivor’s pensions. In the following, only the own pensions will be 
explained in more detail. 
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Own pensions include the regular old-age pension, early retirement pension on grounds of long-
term insurance contributions, corridor pensions, manual labor pensions and invalidity or 
occupational disability pensions (Federal Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Health and Consumer 
Protection (BMAGSK) 2018). 
Regular old-age pensions can be claimed when having reached the statutory pension age, which is 
65 for men and 60 for women, with the retirement age for women being gradually increased to 65 
starting 2024 until it has reached 65 in 2033. According to the Ministry of Social Affairs (2018), in 
order to receive pension benefits, insurees must have accumulated a minimum of 180 contribution 
months, which accounts to 15 years. Of these 15 years, seven need to be derived from gainful 
employment. For claimants born after January 1, 1955, the General Pensions Act applies, providing 
the personal pensions account. In addition, periods of unpaid care work can be considered for 
pension contributions and periods of education can be bought and are credited as contribution 
periods of a voluntary pension scheme (ibid.).  
Early retirement on grounds of long-term insurance contributions (Hacklerregelung NEU) can be 
requested by men who have collected 45 contribution years and lets them retire at the age of 62 
without abductions. This does not apply to women. 
Under the concept of corridor pensions (Korridorpensionen) claimants (men) can retire early when 
having accumulated at least 40 years of insurance at the age of 62. Deductions account to 5.1% per 
year of early retirement or 0.425% per month (Bundesministerium für Arbeit, Soziales, Gesundheit 
und Konsumentenschutz (BMASGK) 2019b). There is a cap on deductions of 15.3%. This does not 
apply to women. 
Manual labor pensions (Schwerarbeitspensionen) enable workers who perform physically 
demanding work to retire already at the age of 60. With a minimum insurance period of 45 years, at 
least 10 of the last 20 years must have been spent in physically demanding work (ibid.). Deductions 
account to 4.2% per year (0.35% monthly) and a maximum of 13.8%.  
The new invalidity pension scheme (Invaliditätspension neu) is awarded only when permanent 
disability or incapacity to work is ascertained. This type of public pension aims to reduce the number 
of invalidity pensions and help workers with health issues reintegrate into the labor market. 
Temporarily seriously ill people will obtain medical treatment and rehabilitation from regional health 
insurance funds (Federal Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Health and Consumer Protection 
(BMAGSK) 2018). 
Austria 
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Table 1 Austrian Pension Pillars and Tiers 
The public pension scheme in Austria is by far the most important source of income in retirement 
for older adults. As table 1 shows, the public pension makes up about 89% of the income of retirees, 
whereas income from occupational and private pensions is at under 10%. To date, the public pension 
aims to ensure a decent standard of living from earnings of one’s working life. The Austrian pension 
system is a clear example of state pensions crowding out other forms of pension earnings due to 





4. PENSION HISTORY IN GERMANY 
The conservative welfare state has reformed its pay-as-you-go pension scheme from a single-pillar 
system, heavily relying on public pensions and therefore the contributions of those in gainful 
employment, to a multi-pillar scheme, putting more risk on the individual with the state taking less 
responsibility.  
In the following, as done in the last chapter, key turning points in German pension policy will be 
described briefly. The chapter will close by portraying the current state of the pension system. 
1. The German pension landscape in the 20 th  century 
As in Austria, a general trend towards benefit retrenchment is visible already since the late 1980s 
(Wörz 2011). The 1989 Pension Reform Act resolved the phasing out of several pension types, such 
as the old-age pension for women, or old-age pensions due to unemployment, and introduced 
deduction for retirement prior to the statutory retirement age while phasing in higher statutory 
retirement ages of 65 years (ibid.). Further the pension calculation switched from gross to net wage 
indexation (Schludi 2005). Other major retrenchment measures showed a decrease of credited 
periods of tertiary schooling from 13 to a maximum of 7 years at a maximum of 75% of average 
earnings. As a countermeasure, longer periods for child-raising were credited (at 90% of average 
earnings for the first 4 years for babies born after 1991) and part-time pensions before reaching the 
statutory retirement age were introduced. These measures and the curtailment of non-contributory 
benefits (except the extension of credited periods of child-raising) prevented the estimated 
contribution rate to increase from a level of 18.7% in 1990 to more than 36% in 2030 (Schludi 2005). 
Instead, the contribution rate would increase to (only) 27% with these reforms (ibid.).  
As a result of German reunification, the 1990s showed pension reforms under the conservative-right 
coalition which accelerated the speed of retrenchment for the coming years and targeted pension 
spending stabilization in the long-term (ibid.). The pension system was extended to the East German 
Länder and due to the higher employment rate of women in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), 
the share of pension benefits for women also increased drastically (ibid.). Schludi (2005) describes 
the most dramatic development being the sharp decline of employment levels due to the collapse 
of the GDR. Because Germany wanted to join the European Monetary Union, which had a 3.0% 
budget deficit criterion, more retrenchment measures had to be taken as the fiscal pressures of 
reunification caused a budget deficit of 3.4% in 1996. In a joint effort by the government and the 
social partners, the so-called Alliance for Jobs, the ‘elderly part-time work’ was introduced, which 
aimed at reducing the misuse of legal early retirement options and at reducing youth unemployment 
(ibid.). As for the pension due to unemployment, the age limit was to be gradually increased from 
60 to 63 years, with a reduction of 3.6% per year of early retirement (ibid.). For the unemployed 
people at the time, this would not apply. After the elections in 1996, the Growth and Employment 
Promotion Act was presented, which was to cut sick pay from 100% to 80% and lower employment 
protection rules. Pension policy further included cuts in non-contributory benefits and the phasing 
in of the increased retirement age for women (65) by 2001 instead of 2012. Credited periods of 
tertiary education were reduced to 3 years. This reform introduced the end of pension consensus 
and led to massive protests organized by the trade unions. Since the 1996 pension reform did not 
have the impact hoped for in the long-term, the Kohl government introduced the Pension Reform 
Act in 1997, introducing a demographic factor into the pension formula by which increases in life 
expectancy were taken into account and which would lead to even lower pension levels (64% instead 
of 70%, ibid.). Further, eligibility criteria for disability pensions were tightened and the retirement 
age for disability pensions increased to 63 years (Wörz 2011). Also, the value-added tax was 
increased from 15 to 16% (1% increase) (ibid.).  
In the elections in 1998 the power structures changed in favor of the Social Democrats and the Green 
party, who both did not support the pension retrenchment measures of the Christian Democrats 
from the 1990s. In charge, the Schröder government got rid of the demographic factor and 
suspended the reform of the disability pensions (Schludi 2005). Social insurance coverage was 
expanded to those in atypical forms of employment and the federal subsidy to finance the pension 
scheme was increased. Through personnel changes in the Social Democratic party as well as the 
pressing need for cost-containment and reforms, Schröder drastically reduced the assessment base 
of pension contributions. Further, Schludi (2005, 147) explains that ‘the Schröder government 
decided to suspend the indexation of net wages for two years and to switch to consumer price 
indexation instead’, which made pension levels fall even more than with the demographic factor, 




2. Paradigmatic reforms at the turn of the century  
The proper, paradigmatic, and in this paper crucial, reform of the German pension system followed 
a few months later with proposals by Minister of Social Affairs, Walter Riester. Riester and the newly 
elected Finance Minister, Hans Eichel, as well as Gerhard Schröder himself were in favor of 
conservative fiscal policy and modernizing the pensions (ibid.). According to Schludi (2005), Riester 
suggested the expansion of the pay-as-you-go pension scheme to rely more heavily on the second, 
occupational, and specifically the third, private, pillar. The first suggestions included a 
supplementary private funded pillar on a mandatory basis financed by workers’ contributions, a 
minimum protection system within the statutory public insurance and another reform of disability 
pensions. Further, married women should be able to claim their own independent pension (ibid.). 
These suggestions had to be debated with all veto players, namely the trade unions, other major 
parties (such as the liberal FDP and the conservative Christian Democrats) as well as the left wing of 
the ruling Social Democratic Party. The final reform included the following changes (based on Schludi 
2015, 150f and Wörz 2011, 28): 
• A return to net wage indexation in 2001. 
• Cuts in the public pillar with a cap on benefit retrenchment. Public pensions were not allowed 
to fall below a net replacement rate of 67%. 
• The fully funded private pillar was made voluntary and promoted by the government in the 
form of tax-free allowances fixed at 4%. The government therefore established so-called 
‘Riester-Renten’. Families with children should receive special supplements if they invest in 
private pension funds.  
• Cuts in widows’ pensions.  
• The taxable share of pensions was raised to 50% in 2005 and to 100% by 2040. 
• The introduction of a means-tested social assistance within the public pillar.  
According to Ebbinghaus and Neugschwendner (2011) a change to a multi-pillar pension system is 
recommended by international organizations such as the World Bank and the EU. These models are 
recommended to look as follows: 
‘the first [pension] pillar serves essentially redistributive purposes by providing a minimum income 
in old age, the second is an earnings-related pension tied to employment performance, and the third 
is a ‘topping up’’ (Ebbinghaus and Neugschwender 2011). 
 
The German government in the early 2000s followed these recommendations and changed its 
pension system accordingly. In doing so, the German old age security system became more 
Germany 
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sustainable over the long term. The German pension system is summarized by Ebbinghaus et al. 
(2011) in Table 2. 
3. Latest policy changes  
With the goal of keeping contribution rates under 20% until 2020, the minimum pension levels have 
decreased since the turn of the millennium. Further reforms after the paradigmatic Riester reform 
have targeted early retirement (Hofäcker and Naumann 2015). For instance, from July 2005 the age 
at which old age pensions due to unemployment can be received at the earliest has been increased 
from 60 to 63 years (Bäcker 2018b). Later, in 2012, an increase in the statutory regular pensionable 
age was brought into effect (ibid.). As of 2029, the statutory retirement age will be 67 years. All early 
retirement schemes have been given deductions of up to 14.4% (ibid.). Further, the minimum 
retirement age for the old age pensions for those with long contribution periods has been increased 
to 63 years (ibid.). As of 2017, beneficiaries of 50 years and older are allowed to make additional 
contributions to the public pension (ibid.). 
In addition, Germany has enacted measures to increase employment in old age (50+ years), such as 
providing further training allowance for older adults and giving grants to businesses which employ 
older adults who have been unemployed before (ibid.).  
As of 2001, invalidity pensions have been changed into two separate pension entitlements: 1. For 
those not being able to work 3 hours a day (full reduced earning capacity pension) and 2. For those 
who are able to work between 3 and under 6 hours a day (half reduced earning capacity pension) 
(ibid.). The minimum eligible age was 63 years and was changed to 65 years without deductions in 
2012. Making use of this retirement option before the age of 65 means deductions from the 
individual pension of a maximum of 10.8% (ibid.).  
In order to make the transition from gainful employment to retirement easier, Germany introduced 
a new retirement path in 2017 (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales 2020). This new path 
towards retirement lets beneficiaries reduce their work hours before having reached the statutory 
pension age and receive parts of their pension entitlements early. 
Voluntary occupational pensions have also been reformed. From 2002 occupational pension 
entitlements were vested, first with a minimum period of 5 years that the beneficiary was employed 
with one employer (at an age of 30) (Bäcker 2018b).This has been reformed so that a person’s 
entitlements are now vested after 3 years with the same employer and a minimum age of the 
employee of 21 (ibid.). Pension entitlements could be taken along to a new employer as of 2005 
(ibid.). 
4. Status quo 2020 
The current German pension system is based on a multi-pillar model which focusses on individual 
savings plans for old age security and in which the state pension (first pillar) serves as a means for 
poverty alleviation (Ebbinghaus et al. 2011). 
As shown above (Table 2), the German state pension makes up about 86% of income in retirement. 
The state pension has been expanded to more professions as well as those working few hours a 
week (so-called mini-jobbers) (Bäcker 2018b). In 2018, 83,8% of all dependent labor force were 
insured in the statutory pension (Statistisches Bundesamt 2020). The benefits have been retrenched 
in the past two decades, leaving the gross replacement rate at 46% of lifetime earnings (Bäcker 
2018b). Criteria for specific early retirement paths (such as the reduced earning capacity pension) 
have been tightened whereas others have been reformed (for instance old age pension for long 
insurance periods can be used from 63 years but only with deductions (ibid.). In the statutory 
pension, as far as insurance-legal requirements are fulfilled, the insured can retire either early with 
deductions, or at the regular retirement age, which is being gradually increased to 67 years until 
2029 (Schmitz-Kießler 2019). When making use of early retirement, not only are there deductions 
but there is also an additional earnings limit (ibid.). Another possibility to retire earlier has been 
introduced in as recent as 2017 with the flexibilization of the transition into retirement by being able 
to receive a part of the pension benefits (so-called partial pension) already before the statutory 
retirement age and stay in the labor market (Bäcker 2018b). Working beyond the statutory 
pensionable age has no negative effects on individual public pension benefits and no additional 
earnings limits (Schmitz-Kießler 2019).  
The German statutory pension system contains two pension paths for people with reduced earning 
capacity (Bäcker 2018b). The full reduced earning capacity pension and the half reduced earning 
capacity pension. These also carry additional earnings limits (Schmitz-Kießler 2019).  
Occupational pensions have seen a massive expansion in the 21st century. For instance, employers 
introducing an occupational pension scheme receive tax benefits. For employees, the vesting period 
for being able to switch employers and keep the accumulated pension benefits has been gradually 
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been removed. After working for the same employer for three years at a minimum age of 21 years, 
employees are now able to transfer their accumulated occupational pension benefit to a new 
employer (ibid).  
Private pension schemes such as the Riester or Rürup pensions have been made more customer 
friendly (ibid.). For instance, deferred compensation is now permanent and there is a cap on costs 
for changing private pension funds (150€ max.) (ibid.). There is also the possibility to take 
accumulated capital from the Riester pension for building property ownership (ibid.). 
 
  
5. PENSION REFORMS TARGETING LATER 
RETIREMENT 
Retirement timing of older adults is rather individual, with visible patterns in different groups of 
citizens across countries. As will be discussed later, this is a result of not just individual choice but 
also depends on the institutional setting as well as occupational pension benefits. For Germany, 
Hofäcker and Naumann (2015) observe a trend towards late retirement with people staying in the 
labor market well after the statutory retirement age. Many would be eligible to retire with pension 
benefits, but still stay in the labor market. Reasons for late retirement include financial and non-
financial aspects (Hofäcker et al. 2019), the individual ability (e.g. health aspects; ibid.), a certain 
desire to stay (Hofäcker and Naumann 2015) and many more.  
Hinrichs (2000) argues that since the 1980s a general trend towards welfare retrenchment and 
especially reforming pension policy has taken place in OECD countries. This trend includes increasing 
the pension age, harmonizing special pension schemes (for example pensions for civil servants with 
the public pension) and expanding pension testing in first-pillar pensions, especially in social security 
countries (ibid.). These reforms have taken place in different ways and each country had and has its 
own way of reforming the social security system in its country to be sustainable in the longer term. 
This is also the case in Germany and Austria (Blank et al. 2016a).  
In comparison between Germany and Austria, Hofäcker et al. (2019) argue that Austria has not made 
enough efforts to work against early retirement. They base their assumptions on still existing early 
retirement schemes as well as a high net replacement rate for regular old-age pensions. Hofäcker et 
al. (2019) focus on statutory retirement ages and early retirement schemes but ignore the massive 
reforms that have taken place around the turn of the century and further reforms regarding e.g. 
reformed invalidity pensions in the past few years.  
Reforms targeting later retirement can be grouped in three branches: early retirement schemes, 
invalidity pensions, general elements of the pension system. Generally, the assessment base for a 
regular pension at 80% of previous income from gainful employment can be obtained after 45 years 
instead of 15 (Mayrhuber 2006). Austria has switched to defined-benefit pension accounts ‘with 
distinct and very transparent incentives for a later retirement’ (Türk 2019, 370). 
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In his paper, Türk (2019) names various measures concerning early retirement paths, such as the 
gradual increase of pensionable ages (increase of 18 months), the abolition of early retirement due 
to unemployment and due to long insurance periods. In case of heavy labor and very long insurance 
periods (45 years), citizens are eligible to retire at 60 years of age (ibid.). Early retirement still is 
possible when having reached the age of 62 with 40 years insurance record. However, deductions 
amount to 5.1% (instead of 4.2% before 2017; ibid.).  
As for invalidity pensions, temporary invalidity was abolished (ibid.). Instead, funds for rehabilitation 
measures were introduced. The unemployment office is responsible for occupational retraining and 
introduced various active labor market programs together with the government (Türk (2019) 
provides more details in German).  
Active labor market measures in Austria include incentives such as higher pension payments for 
more years in the labor market. Men between the ages of 65 and 68 and women between 60 and 
63 years of age, respectively, will be rewarded with an increase in benefits of 4.2% or up to 5.1% 
penalties per year on pension benefits in the case of early retirement (Federal Ministry of Labour, 
Social Affairs, Health and Consumer Protection 2018; Federal Ministry of Finance 2018). Pension 
income is seen as income from gainful employment, thus pensioners are obliged to pay income tax 
(Federal Ministry of Finance 2020). Although, pensioners are able to get Incentives for employers 
such as defined periods of paying less non-wage labor costs for employing older workers have been 
implemented in recent years (BMASGK, 2019). 
 
Hofäcker et al. (2019) neglect to mention that the participation rate of those between 55 and 64 
years old has doubled in the time span of 1994 to 2019 (29.4% to 56.4%) (OECD 2020). In fact, the 
average retirement age (for men and women) has risen from 57.39 years in 2005 to 60.55 years in 
2018 with an upwards trend (Statistik Austria 2020, see Table 3). According to a long-term projection 
of the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (2019) the effective retirement age (for own 
pensions) will increase to 63 years for men and 62.1 years for women in 2060. In addition, they 
project 10% lower pension benefits for men and 7% lower benefits for women in the long term (as 
opposed to 2018). This is a result of the APG, which passed as a law in 2004 (ibid.). 
Germany has undertaken different measures to ensure the sustainability of its pension system. The 
German red-green government at the turn of the century has reformed the pension system towards 
more responsibility for individuals and less for the state by drastically retrenching benefits in the first 
pension pillar. In the hope of cutting pension expenditures, the government closed pathways to early 
retirement, increased the statutory retirement age for both men and women and promoted taking 
out private pension insurances (second and third pillar pensions). In doing so, the government 
followed the suggestions of international organizations such as the European Union in restructuring 
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The most important reforms in Germany targeted the general pension system, reduced earning 
capacity pensions (which are the equivalent to invalidity pensions in Austria) and early retirement 
paths.  
In the face of low net replacement rates (average pension income from public pension was around 
67% of lifetime earnings in 2005, and it is decreasing; Bäcker et al. 2008), the German government 
explicitly encourages workers to work beyond the statutory pension age by granting additional 
benefits of 0.6% per month between the ages of 65 to 67. In postponing benefit receipt beyond the 
statutory retirement age, older workers receive additional benefits of 0.5% per month as soon as 
they receive their pension payments (Schmitz 2018). The pensionable age is gradually increased to 
67 years until 2029 (Bäcker 2018b). Regular old age pensions can only be obtained without 
deductions at the age of 65 (this age is gradually increased in monthly steps starting in 2012), except 
for the pension for the profoundly disabled (Bäcker et al. 2008). In this case, the earliest possible 
age a pension can be received is 63. With these measures, Germany has reformed retirement 
schemes so that there are no financial incentives for retiring early.  
In the case of longer employment while drawing a pension, the income from gainful employment 
will not be counted (ibid.). Employee contributions for pension insurance and unemployment 
insurance do not have to be paid, while there is an option to pay those contributions in order to 
increase the later pension benefits (ibid.). According to Bäcker (2018b), employer and employee can 
agree on an extension of an employment contract beyond the statutory pension age. 
Reduced earning capacity pensions have been reformed insofar, as categories have been 
established: partial reduced earning capacity pensions have been established for those who can 
work three to under six hours a day (Bäcker 2018b). Full reduced earning capacity pensions are 
designated to those who can work zero to under three hours a day (ibid.). Assessment criteria have 
been tightened (ibid.). Reduced earning capacity pensions are generally temporary and require 
reapplication every three years (ibid.). In case of early retirement (before the age of 65), regular 
pensions are deducted a maximum of 10.8% (ibid.).  
Germany managed to reduce public pension spending in the long term in order to counteract 
demographic ageing. Both Germany and Austria have managed to increase labor market 
participation for older adults (citizens aged 50 to 64) and especially for women. Table 4 shows the 
labor market participation rates of women and men aged 50 to 64 for Austria and Germany (Eurostat 
2020a). In both countries, a significant increase can be observed, showing that both reform histories 
have had positive effects on longer participation in the labor market (see figure 2). 
Blank et al. (2016a) argue that crucial reforms in Germany in the early 2000s (specifically the 2001 
and 2004 reforms) have weakened the first pillar pensions and individual, private pensions 
(Eigenvorsorge) could not compensate the drastic retrenchment of pension benefits. This view is 
also supported by the OECD (2019). The annual ‘Pensions at a Glance’ report for 2019 emphasizes a 
great risk of poverty for low earners because of the low net replacement of 56% of previous earnings. 
For average earners, the net replacement rate is 52% (ibid.). These rather high net replacement rates 
for low income earners depict an ideal rather than the reality. Employment biographies are more 
prone now than in the past to be disrupted by periods of unemployment or non-gainful 
employment. The OECD (2019) project an increase in pension expenditures despite a 10% drop in 
pension levels for German citizens. Not only low earners, but also many other groups will be exposed 
to the risk of old-age poverty in the near future. Amongst them are workers in atypical forms of 
employment, single parents and self-employed (ibid.). The gender pension gap is the highest among 
all OECD countries with 46% (ibid.).  
Figure 2 Employment rates by sex, age and citizenship 
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As a top performer, Germany has managed to increase its labor market participation rates of older 
adults drastically. In fact, there is a profound increase in the participation rates beyond statutory 
pension age in Germany as well. Figure 3 shows that this trend has increased rapidly since the 2004 
reforms have become law (Eurostat 2020a). There is a remarkable increase from 2.5% in 1995 to 
7.4% in 2018. 
Summarizing, Germany and Austria both have made efforts to keep pension expenditures 
sustainable for the future. Both countries needed to reform their pension systems to sustain 
demographic ageing and both have. What did the two countries do differently? The most important 
aspect of the countries’ reform histories is a paradigmatic one. Austria has reformed its pension 
system from within and held on to the public pension pillar as a guarantee to a decent standard of 
living (Blank et al. 2016c). Occupational and private pensions still only play a secondary role in 
Austria, but benefit retrenchment has occurred in the state pension insurance. Pathways to early 
retirement have been reformed, but generally not been cancelled.  
Germany has chosen a different path, departing from the traditional Bismarckian single-pillar pay-
as-you-go scheme. Instead, a multi-pillar scheme has evolved, weakening the public pillar and 
putting more attention to private pension schemes. The German statutory pension scheme now 
primarily functions as social safety net, promoting private provision for old age. Both Germany and 
Figure 3 Employment rates by sex, age and citizenship 
Austria have managed to counteract demographic ageing and ensure sustainability of their public 
pensions. The reform paths that were chosen now show different results with the risk of poverty 










2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by sex 
[TEPSR_LM410] 
Germany Austria




1. Data and Sample 
For the empirical research, data from the seventh wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing, and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE) was used. The SHARE longitudinal, cross-national and 
multidisciplinary survey aims at providing nationally representative micro-level panel data of 
economic, social and health factors, which influence and accompany ageing processes at individual 
and societal levels (cf. Börsch-Supan et al. 2013). SHARE collects data from 140.000 citizens in 
European countries aged 50 years and older. SHARE’s wave 7 had its fieldwork done in 2017, was 
released in 2019 and included eight new countries (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, Latvia, Malta, Romania 
and Slovakia) in addition to Hungary, Austria, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, 
France, Denmark, Greece, Switzerland, Belgium, Czech Republic, Poland, Luxembourg, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Estonia, Croatia, Lithuania, and Israel. According to Wahrendorf et al. (2017) SHARE 
provides data with above average household response rates in comparison to other European 
surveys. Wave 7 is the newest survey wave and thus provides latest findings on important topics. 
The SHARE datasets cover various modules, such as ‘employment and pensions’, ‘household income’, 
which enable to investigate the hypothesis mentioned above. For instance, the module on 
employment and pensions asks about current work activities, income sources (pension income, from 
gainful employment or others). Additionally, data on reasons for retiring and pension benefit receipt 
from different sources is collected. The questionnaire includes an assessment of the psychosocial 
environment of the last main job, allowing to search for influences of working conditions on 
retirement decisions.  
Wave 7 includes a SHARELIFE module, which covers retrospective questions on employment, work 
quality, health, finances and more. The SHARELIFE retrospective questionnaire allows a life course 
perspective for exploring what role work history plays in early or late retirement, as suggested by 
Dingemans and Möhring (2019). In order to reconstruct the life history, a Life History Calendar (LHC) 
approach is used in all Computer Assisted Personal Interviews (CAPI) (Schröder 2011). The survey 
also provides insight into individual’s working conditions by implementing the demand-control 
model by Karasek and Theorell (1990) and the effort-reward imbalance model by Siegrist et al. (2004) 
into the survey. In addition, physical and mental health are explored as well as expectations for the 
future (e.g. regarding the expected age of retirement). For a full list of modules go to share-
project.org.  
The newly released dataset has not yet been studied by many scholars. This thesis will therefore be 
based on very up-to-date data and present an innovation in empirical retirement decision research. 
This section provides insight into which variables are used in order to measure why respondents 
have worked beyond the statutory retirement age. 
The samples are separated by country. There are samples for Germany and Austria each, then one 
for all SHARE countries. The sample includes all cases who responded to the questions, if 
respondents received income from gainful employment (dependent or independent) in the last year.  
First, I describe the sample for Germany and Austria, afterwards the SHARE sample will be discussed 
shortly. 
For Austria, the age threshold for women is 60 and for men 65. For Germany, the age threshold for 
both women and men is 65. The sample for both countries comprises 4787 individuals (N=4787) in 
total, with a gender distribution of 43% men and 57% women and without missing data. The mean 
age among men is 74.1 years, among women 73.16. In the sample, 53.2% of respondents are 
Austrian and 46.8% are German. In Austria, we find that 36.7% are male and 63.3% are female. In 
Germany, a rather even gender distribution with 50.2% men and 49.8% women can be found. 
The total number of valid cases who responded to the question if they received income from gainful 
employment last year is 1137, which, unfortunately, is only 23.8% of all cases in the sample. Within 
this sample, 10.2% of respondents claim that they have received income from dependent or 
independent work or both in the last year. In total, 4 cases stated that they received income from 
dependent and independent employment in the last year.   
In the Austrian sample, the variable asking if one received income in the last year comprises 461 
cases, of which 36% are male and 64% are female. Within this variable, only 6.3% of all respondents 
state that they received income from gainful employment in the last year. The gender distribution 
of those, who received income either from dependent or independent employment or both, is 
rather equal (44.8% men, 55.2% women). In the German sample, the variable asking if one received 
income in the last year comprises 676 cases, of which 49.4% are male and 50.6% are female. Within 
both genders, 12.9% of participants have responded that they received income from gainful 
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employment in the last year. Again, the cases are distributed rather equally across the two gender 
categories (52.9% men versus 47.1% women). Interestingly, the case distribution shows that a lot 
less individuals answered the question connected to this variable in Austria than in Germany. Figure 
5 gives an overview of the male and female respondents for each country and the SHARE population 
sample according to the variable in investigation. 
 
In the SHARE population the age threshold for both women and men is 65. 24.1% of all respondents 
have answered if they received income from gainful employment in the last year. Thus, the SHARE 
sample consists of 11083 cases in total. Of the valid data, 9% have claimed to have received income 
from employment in the last year. The sample comprises 44.4% men and 55.6% women. 12.5% in 
the male group and 6.2% in the female group responded, that they were employed in the last year. 
2. Measures 
A filter on the entire datasets is applied, excluding all respondents in Germany below 65 years as 
well as men below 65 years and women below 60 years in Austria. The SHARE sample consists of 
respondents above the 65-year threshold. This step excludes all respondents below the statutory 
retirement age and leaves the sample with everyone above this age threshold in their respectable 
country. 
The dependent variable in this thesis is ‘working after the statutory retirement age’. To determine if 
someone is in fact employed or has been in the last year, a measure on income from gainful 
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Figure 5 Percentage of people with income from gainful employment in the last year 
to measure factual employment status in the SHARE survey, since the other option, namely the 
question ‘In general, which of the following best describes your current employment situation?’, is 
a subjective ascription. The measure used in this paper combines cases with income from dependent 
employment and independent employment. Both original variables were recoded so that ‘Don’t 
Know’ and ‘Refuse’ were coded as missing, ‘No’ was coded as 0 and ‘Yes’ was coded as 1. 
Preceding the application of the independent variables of gender, age and education, categorial 
variables with more than two response options are recoded into dummy-variables. Applying this, I, 
for instance, follow Hofäcker et al. (2016) who suggest to recode the education variable as asked in 
the SHARE survey into three groups for easier interpretation in the regression models: lower 
secondary education or less (International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 0-2), upper 
secondary education (ISCED 3-4) and tertiary education (ISCED 5 and higher). 
Crucial information on reasons why respondents work beyond the statutory retirement age includes 
if their total monthly household income is enough to make ends meet (CO007_AbleMakeEndsMeet). 
Furthermore, a differentiation is made between public pension benefits and income from 
occupational and private (pension or life) insurances. 
Following Wiß et al. (2019) a sector of employment variable will be included in the analysis. They 
found that ‘the sector of employment is significantly related to age at retirement’ (Wiß et al. 2019, 
18). Economic sectors will be regrouped as follows: manufacturing, industry, trade, finance and 





For the analysis, multiple logistic regression models for both Germany and Austria are computed 
separately. Multiple regression models are commonly used in data analysis and allow to describe 
the relationship between the dependent and one or more independent variables (Hosmer and 
Lemeshow 1989). One can identify the logistic regression model by its binary or dichotomous 
outcome variable in comparison to the linear regression model (ibid.), where the value of the 
dependent variable varies proportionately to the variation of the independent variable(s) (Fromm 
2012). Fromm (2012) argues that logistic regression analysis is used to differentiate between groups 
by identifying variables, which produce these differences as well as predicting their effects. The 
logistic regression model is an example of a generalized linear model, in which estimators of the 
dependent variable cannot be determined through a linear equation, but through the use of a link-
function between linear function and estimators (ibid.). By using a link-function, the regression line 
is transformed into a non-linear trajectory (ibid.). Transferred to the topic of this master thesis, the 
dependent variable ‘income from gainful employment’ is indeed dichotomous (0=no, 1=yes). 
Using SPSS Statistics version 25, I created this binomial logistic regression model with the dependent 
variable being income from gainful employment. As independent variables I included gender, age, 
the level of education and the receipt of pension payments. The constant is as follows: female 
respondents, aged 60/65 (depending on the sample filters) with a low level of education and no 
receipt of a public pension payment (for Austria). For Germany, the receipt of occupational and 
private pension payments as well as payments from a life insurance have been included, with 0=no 
receipt. The SHARE sample additionally includes control variables for Germany and Austria (in 
comparison to all participating SHARE countries) and the aforementioned variable for if the 
household is able to make ends meet, with ‘easily’ being part of the constant. 
Having applied the regression models, it is visible in Table 3 that Austrian sample fitted well. With a 
sample of 457 cases, the Omnibus tests of model coefficients are significant (α=0,001). The 
difference between the -2 Log-Likelihood of the null model and the predictors model is 35.642. At 5 
degrees of freedom, this lies above the critical value of the χ2-distribution. This explains that the 
regression model itself with the included variables is significant so far, that it explains influences on 
the dependent variable better, than the model without the independent variables and just the 
constant. The Nagelkerkes-R² test shows that the model accuracy of the predictors model (Model 1) 
is 20.3% higher than the null model with just the constant (Model 0). 
For Germany, a total of 668 cases are included in the binary logistic regression analysis. The Omnibus 
tests of model coefficients are significant on a α=0,001 level. The difference between the -2 Log-
Likelihood of the null model and the predictors model is 39,884 and lies above the critical value of 
the χ2-distribution at 8 degrees of freedom. Thus, the null hypothesis can be rejected, the goodness 
of fit of the predictors model is significantly better than of the null model. The model summary (table 
6) shows that the predictors model explains 10.8% more of the dependent variable than the null 
model (Nagelkerkes-R2=0.108). 
6792 respondents are included in the regression model for the SHARE population. Again, the 
Omnibus test of model coefficients shows a statistical significance, which allows the analysis of the 
coefficients. The goodness of fit of the predictors model, which includes all independent variables, 
is significantly better than of the null model. The Nagelkerkes-R² test shows that model 1 explains 






1. Descriptive results 
In Austria, 31.5% of those who responded to allincome (the receipt of income from gainful 
employment in the last year), show a low level of education (ISCED 1997 education levels 1 to 2). 
Furthermore, 21.2% have completed medium education (ISCED 1997 education levels 3 to 4). 
Another 47.3% have completed higher education (levels 5 to 6). In Germany, 10.4% of those who 
responded to allincome, show a low level of education (ISCED 1997 education levels 1 to 2). 34.5% 
in this group have completed medium education and 55.1% have completed higher education. 
In the SHARE sample, 46.6% of all respondents have completed a low level of education (ISCED 1997 
education levels 1 to 2), 32.9% of respondents have completed medium levels of education (levels 
3 to 4) and 20.5% have completed high education (levels 5+). Of those, who claimed to have had 
income from employment in the last year, 39.1% have completed medium levels of education. 36% 
have completed higher levels of education and the rest (24.9%) have a low level of education. 
In Austria, the mean age of all respondents included in the analysis is 74.8 years old, with the median 
at 74 years. The mean age for male respondents is 74.3 years and for female respondents 75 years. 
The mean age of the German population included in the analysis is 73.9 years, with the median at 
73 years. The mean age for male respondents is 74.2 years and for female respondents 73.7 years. 






















In the SHARE sample, the mean age of all respondents in the sample is 75 years. The mean age of all 
men in the sample is 74 years and women 75.2 years. In the male group, the mean age of those who 
claim to have received income in the last year is 70 years. Similarly, in the female group the mean 
age is 69.9 years. 
Further, 90.7% of Austrian and German participants in the survey received payments from a public 
pension in the last year. In terms of gender distribution, it becomes clear that there are far more 
men who received public pension payments in the year prior to the interview than women. Whereas 
almost all the male respondents received public pension payments (98%), this looks very different 
in the female group of respondents. Here, only 85% received public pensions.  
The second pension pillar, occupational pensions, shows another picture. Here, only 18.1% all 
respondents, whether male or female, received pension payments in the last year. Among men, only 
24% could draw from an occupational pension. Again, the percentage of women, who received 
payments from occupational pensions in the last year is lower. 13.4% of women benefited from 
occupational pensions in the last year.  
The private sector of old age income is almost not present. Independent of gender, only 2.4% of 
respondents claim to have received income from a private pension insurance in the last year. This is 
3.2% of all men and 1.7% of all women, who answered to the income from gainful employment 
question (allincome). Lastly, only 2.2% of respondents received payments from a private life 
insurance in the last year. Only 2% of men and 2.4% of women state, that they received income from 
this source.  
Before looking at Austria and Germany separately, I want to acknowledge that there is a clear pattern 
of importance here. Citizens in both countries heavily rely on the public pension system. Whereas 
the second pillar is somewhat important, and the amount of income citizens typically draw from this 
have not been discussed yet, the private pillar appears to hold the least importance in old age 
income. 
In Austria, 82.4% of all those, who responded to the allincome question, received public pension 
payments in the last year. Analogous to the complete sample, there is a big gender divide. Whereas 
96.4% of men receive pension payments, only 74.6% of women do. Further, the amount of statutory 
pension payments varies also across gender. On average, men received 1520€ in monthly public 
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pension benefits in the last year, whereas women only received 1283€. Looking at the median for 
women’s income, it is noticeable that this is a lot lower at 855€, whereas it is even higher for men 
with 1555€. Additionally, by looking at the 80%-mark, women’s income is at 1400€ and men’s income 
is at 2000€. This information needs to be reflected on carefully, since this probably does not 
represent Austria in reality. The sample size for this variable is at 380 respondents (220 women, 160 
men). A calculation with register data would be much more precise. Nevertheless, this clearly shows 
a gender income gap (see figure 7). 
Similar to the overall data, the second pillar is not of much importance for the Austrian population. 
In total, only 3.7% of respondents received pension payments from their company’s pension 
schemes in the last year. Again, a big difference between men and women can be observed. 6.7% of 
all men and only 2% of all women received occupational pension benefits.  
The third pillar seems to be the least important in Austria. 2% of all respondents receive either 
private pensions or private life insurances or both in Austria. That is 2.4% of all men and 1.7% of all 
women receiving private benefits.  
This shows the importance of the Austrian public old age security system. With only the public 
pension scheme in Austria being compulsory, occupational and private pension benefits are rather 
rare and inconsistent in their amount.  
In Germany, 96.4% of all respondents receive public old age pension benefits. 98.8% of men and 

















Figure 6 Austria: Average Public Pension Income in EUR 
payments varies strongly across gender. Men receive almost 50% more money from public pension 
benefits than women (1992.3€ versus 1086€ on average). Looking at the median for women’s and 
men’s income, the differences in income seem high as well. The median income for women is at 
773€ and for men at 1300€. Even worse, 80% of all women who answered this question on the 
amount of monthly public pension income do not receive more than 1200€ a month, while men 
receive 2100€ a month. This information needs to be reflected on carefully, since this probably does 
not represent the real German situation. The sample size for this variable is very small with only 649 
respondents (319 women and 330 men). Although a calculation based on register data would be 
much more precise, the data used here still shows a large gender pay gap throughout one’s working 
career, that can also be found in register data. 
Contrary to Austria, where only 3.7% receive payments from occupational pensions, we find that 
27.9% of all respondents receive payments in Germany. Again, almost 10% more men than women 
received benefits in the last year (32.6% of men versus 23.2% of women). The pattern of gender 
income inequality can also be observed in this pillar. On average, women earn about 70% less money 
from occupational pensions than men (531€ versus 1866€ monthly). This is also clearly shown with 
the 80%-mark: 80% of women receive 500€ or less from occupational pensions while 56% of men 
receive the same or less. Instead, 80% of men receive 1600€ or less from occupational pensions (see 
figure 8). Again, this needs to be reflected on with caution, since the sample size is very small (188 
respondents in total). 
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Further 6.4% of all participants have received benefits from either private pensions or private life 
insurances or both in the last year. Here, the cases are distributed rather equally across gender with 
6.6% of men and 6.1% of women having received additional income from this source.  
The descriptive data for Germany confirms a clear institutional difference to Austria. As described in 
Chapter 5, Germany has reformed its pension system towards a multi-pillar system, promoting 
private and occupational ways of saving money for retirement age. Whereas the second and third 
pension pillars cover the least amount of old age income in Austria, we see that a third of the 
analyzed German population has received pension benefits from those non-public pillars. 
In the SHARE sample, 79.1% of all respondents receive payments from public pensions. 86.9% of all 
male respondents receive public pension benefits, whereas only 73% of all women do. Furthermore, 
only 14.1% of all respondents received occupational pension benefits in the last year. This is 
distributed rather equally across gender: 16% of men and 12.7% of women claim to have received 
second pillar benefits. The third pension pillar does not seem to be of great importance in the whole 
SHARE sample either. Only 4% of all respondents claim to have received private pension benefits in 
the last year and 1.3% received payments from a life insurance. 
There are 820 valid cases in total for the variable consumption, which asks if households are able to 
make ends meet. The question has been answered by 348 respondents in Austria and 472 
respondents in Germany, with only 11.8% (96 cases) of all of these respondents claiming to have 
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Figure 7 Germany: Average Income from Public and Occupational Pensions 
(59.1%) and almost 30% state that this is ‘fairly’ easy for them (238 cases). This is represented 
similarly in the separate countries. Both in Austria and Germany we find 29% respondents claiming 
they can make ends meet ‘fairly easily’. The percentage of respondents claiming this is ‘easy’ is 59.5% 
in Austria and 58.9% in Germany (see figure 9). Due to the very small number of cases in two of the 
categories (‘with great difficulty’ and ‘with some difficulty’), this variable cannot be included in the 
regression analysis. 
Taking a look at the SHARE sample it is visible that 12.7% of all respondents in the SHARE sample 
claim to be able to make ends meet with great difficulty (see figure 9). Whereas 23.4% of 
respondents have ‘some difficulty’ making ends meet, the majority in this sample makes ends meet 
‘fairly easily’ (26.5%) or ‘easily’ (37.4%). Due to the case numbers in the larger sample, the variable 
will also be applied in the regression analysis. 
Unfortunately, the last independent variable, sector of employment has only a few valid cases. 
Austria shows only 6 and Germany 14 valid cases for investigation. Most cases (5 in Austria, 11 in 
Germany) are in the service sector, one case is in the manufacturing sector (Austria) and one case 




cannot be used in any further multivariate analysis. Interestingly, even in the SHARE sample with a 
much large sample, the number of cases for the sector of employment variable seems to be very 
low. Only 177 respondents have answered, in which sector of employment they work. Analogous to 
the sample with only Austria and Germany, the majority of cases can be found in the service sector 
(108 cases). 
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    Germany  Austria SHARE   
  Gender male 334 166 4921   
        
  Gender female 342 295 6162   
        
  Mean age men 74,2 74,3 74   
        
  Mean age women 73,7 75 75,2   
        
  low level of education 70 144 4881   
        
  
medium level of 
education 371 216 2148   
        
  high level of education 232 97 3439   
 
Table 3 Case numbers (n) of independent variables 
Table 10 shows all n of independent variables which have been applied to all regression analyses. 
Thus, the variable for the question if households are able to make ends meet and for the sector of 
employment are not included in the table.  
2. Logistic regression analysis  
After the descriptive analysis of all variables, the binary logistic regression analysis will be discussed 
in the following. Three separate regression models were run, one for each country. Since there are 
major differences in case numbers across the two countries, the Austrian regression model does not 
include variables for the second and third pension pillar, which are occupational pension, life 
insurance and private personal pension. Furthermore, data on consumption (being able to make 
ends meet) and sector of employment are insufficient, which is why none of these variables are 
included in the regression models. First, Austria will be analyzed, followed by Germany. At last, I 
analyze the whole SHARE sample, to see if the missing variables and small number of cases might 























Notes: *Sign. < 0.1, **Sign. < 0,01, ***Sign. < 0,001 
Furthermore, table 15 shows that only the age of the respondents, significantly influences if 
respondents received income from gainful employment in the last year. A negative correlation 
between income and age can be observed. The odds that respondents received income from gainful 
employment in the last year decrease with increasing age by a factor of 0.839. 
The statistical insignificance of other variables in the logistic regression model might be caused by 
the small sample number in Austria (N=457). The correlation between male gender and income from 
gainful employment in the last year for those above the age of 65 and 60, respectively is quite 
interesting. The odds for men to being employed in old age is 43.5% higher than for women. 
However, this needs to be examined with caution, since the gender variable is not significant. 
Moreover, the receipt of a public old age pension has a positive, yet insignificant, effect on the 
receipt of income from gainful employment. Reflecting on the direction of correlation, the receipt 
of public old age pension and working after having reached the statutory retirement age can go hand 
in hand and must not exclude each other. Working while receiving pension benefits might be 
financially viable, since the benefit from postponing public pension receipt is only limited. As 
discussed in section 2 of this thesis, being employed while receiving pension benefits seems to be 
Coefficients in the regression model 
  B S.E. Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I.for EXP(B)  
      Lower Upper  
 Gender 0,361 0,435 0,406 1,435 0,611 3,370  
         
 Age -0,175 0,041 0,000*** 0,839 0,774 0,910  
         
 Level of Education        
 Medium 0,080 0,568 0,889 1,083 0,356 3,297  
 High 0,904 0,594 0,128 2,470 0,771 7,913  
         
 Receipt of pensions and 
life insurance 
       
 Public pension 1,632 1,060 0,124 5,112 0,641 40,789  
         
 Constant 7,780 2,938 0,008 2391,910    
 a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: education grouped, gender (1=male), Age of respondent at the 
time of interview, public_pension. 
 
Table 4 Coefficients in the regression model Austria 
rather voluntary than out of financial necessity. In line with the positive effect of a medium or high 
level of education, although not statistically significant, this result points towards those, who are 
willing to stay in the labor market, because they enjoy their job or have a lot of time on their hands. 
Lastly, according to the table, a high level of education is positively associated with having income 
from employment in old age, although the association is statistically insignificant. In line with my 
argumentation in section 2, this would not be surprising. With Austria having generous net 
replacement rates of lifetime earnings and the goal of status maintenance, even groups associated 
with low income do not lose a lot of monthly income after retirement. In addition, there are still 
pathways for early retirement in place, especially designed for those whose jobs include heavy, 






Notes: *Sign. < 0.1, **Sign. < 0,01, ***Sign. < 0,001 
In the regression output ‘Variables in the Equation’ (see table 11), the Wald test shows that not only 
the age of respondents, but also the receipt of public old age pension benefits has a significant effect 
on income from gainful employment in the last year. Similar to Austria, increase in the age of 
respondents has a negative effect on working in retirement. The odds that respondents received 
income from work in the last year decrease with increasing age by a factor of 0.890. 
The receipt of statutory pension benefits is also significantly negatively associated with employment 
in retirement age. According to table 11, the odds of employment in the last year decrease by a 
factor of 0.406 with the receipt of public pension benefits. 
Unfortunately, neither the variables of education, nor the variables of the second and third pension 
pillar show significant effects according to the Wald test for single coefficients. Therefore, 
conclusions can only be made with caution by looking at the directions coefficients are pointing 
towards. 
Table 5 Coefficients in the regression model Germany 
Coefficients in the Regression model 
   B S.E. Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I.for EXP(B)   
            Lower Upper   
  Gender  0,351 0,248 0,156 1,421 0,874 2,309   
           
  Age  -0,116 0,024 0,000*** 0,890 0,850 0,933   
           
  Level of Education   0,991      
  Medium  0,040 0,452 0,929 1,041 0,430 2,523   
  High 0,009 0,470 0,984 1,009 0,402 2,536   
           
  
Receipt of pensions and 
life insurance 
        
  Public pension -0,901 0,496 0,069* 0,406 0,154 1,073   
  Occupational pensions -0,294 0,279 0,292 0,745 0,431 1,288   
  Private pensions -0,510 0,547 0,352 0,601 0,206 1,756   
  Life insurance 0,104 0,675 0,877 1,110 0,295 4,171   
           
  Constant 7,582 1,863 0,000 1962,186      
  
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: education grouped, gender (1=male), public_pension, occup_pensions, Age of respondent at the  
time of interview, private_pensions, life_insurance.   
In chapter 2, I hypothesized that, in Germany, workers with low and high, rather than medium, levels 
of education work beyond retirement age. Estimating based on the insignificant coefficients in the 
regression output for Germany, this hypothesis can be rejected. According to the regression analysis, 
both medium and high levels of education have a positive, yet insignificant, effect on income from 
gainful employment in old age. This is interesting, since, logically, those with low levels of education 
should be more prone to the risk of poverty in old age and therefore find the need to work. This 
argumentation would also be in line with the negative significant association of the receipt of public 
pension benefits and having income from employment.  
Furthermore, the receipt of occupational and private personal pensions as well as life insurances is 
not significant in table 12. From the descriptive analysis, one can speculate that the very low case 
numbers can be a cause for this. As pointed out in section 9a, only 6.4% of all respondents claimed 
to have received payments from any third pillar insurance in the prior year, which are 43 individuals 
in total.  
Similarly to Austria, a positive effect of the gender variable can be estimated. It is observable that 






Notes: *Sign. < 0.1, **Sign. < 0,01, ***Sign. < 0,001 
In this regression model, the analyzed countries, Austria and Germany, are included in the logistic 
regression model as control variables (see table 12). Interestingly, whereas the variable for Austria 
is significant in the model, the one for Germany is not. However, coefficients for both variables are 
negative. For Austria, the odds of having received income from gainful employment by those who 
are 65 years and older are 46.9% lower than for the average SHARE population of all countries. 
Although the variable for Germany is not significant, estimates can be made. With caution one can 
Coefficients in the regression model 
   
B S.E. Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I.for EXP(B)   
            Lower Upper   
  Austria -0,633 0,265 0,016** 0,531 0,316 0,892   
           
  Germany -0,096 0,160 0,550 0,909 0,664 1,244   
           
  Gender 0,630 0,088 0,000*** 1,878 1,580 2,232   
           
  Age  -0,147 0,009 0,000*** 0,864 0,848 0,879   
           
  Level of Education         
  Medium  0,548 0,113 0,000*** 1,730 1,385 2,160   
  High  0,764 0,119 0,000*** 2,148 1,700 2,713   
  
Household able to make 
ends meet 
      
  
  with great difficulty -0,811 0,182 0,000*** 0,444 0,311 0,635   
   with some difficulty -0,587 0,129 0,000*** 0,556 0,431 0,716   
   fairly easily -0,411 0,110 0,000*** 0,663 0,534 0,823   
  
         
  
Receipt of Pensions and 
life insurance 
      
  
   public pension -0,631 0,110 0,000*** 0,532 0,428 0,660   
  occupational pensions 0,457 0,109 0,000*** 1,579 1,275 1,956   
  private pensions 0,213 0,164 0,195 1,237 0,896 1,708   
  receipt of life insurance 0,592 0,263 0,02** 1,807 1,079 3,028   
           
  Constant 8,338 0,657 0,000 4178,368       
  
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: austria, germany, Age of respondent at the time of interview, education grouped, gender 
(1=male), household able to make ends meet with great difficulty, household able to make ends meet with some difficulty, 
household able to make ends meet fairly easily, public_pension, occup_pensions, private_pensions, life_insurance. 
  
Table 6 Coefficients in the regression model SHARE 
record that the odds of Germans having received income from employment in the last year 
decreases by 9.1% as opposed to the SHARE sample.  
As in Germany and Austria, the increasing age of respondents is negatively associated with income 
from employment. With increasing age, the odds of receiving income from employment decrease 
by 13.6%. 
Analogous to Austria and Germany, the level of education, as another significant variable, shows a 
positive effect on income. The higher the level of education, the more likely it is that respondents 
have received income from employment in the last year. Whereas the effect for a medium level of 
education increases by a factor of 1.730, the effect for a high level of education is much stronger. 
With a high level of education, the odds of having received income increase by a factor of 2.148. 
Being male is also positively associated with being employed in retirement age. The regression 
analysis shows a significant positive effect, increasing the odds of having received income by a factor 
of 1.878, or 87.8%.  
The consumption variable, household able to make ends meet, which could not be included in the 
separate regression models for Austria and Germany, due to the small sample sizes in specific groups 
of the variable, shows a significant influence in the SHARE sample. Income and being able to make 
ends meet have a negative correlation, showing that those who have received income in the last 
year can make ends meet significantly easier.  
After discussing the control and consumption variables, level of education, gender, age and being 
able to make ends meet, the pension benefit variables will be discussed.  
According to table 12, the receipt of public pension benefits negatively affects income from gainful 
employment in the last year. Thus, the odds of being employed in retirement age decrease by 46.8% 
in the case of receiving public pension benefits. Interestingly, the receipt of occupational pension 
benefits is positively associated with being employed. The odds of having received income from 
employment increase by a factor of 1.579 in the case of receiving payments from an occupational 
pension scheme. Similarly, the receipt of a life insurance has an even stronger effect on employment. 
The odds of having received income from employment in the last year increase by 80.7% when 
receiving payments from a life insurance.  
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Apart from the variable for Germany, the only other statistically insignificant variable shown in the 
logistic regression model is the receipt of payments from a private pension scheme. This is surprising, 
since the variable for the receipt of payments from a life insurance shows fewer cases although 
statistically significant. Whereas both life insurance and private personal pension fall under the third 




Generally, a small sample size is a major difficulty when performing regression analysis. This is the 
case in both Germany and Austria. Nevertheless, the results show that the age of the respondents 
is a significant factor affecting whether or not Austrian and German citizens at the age of 60 (women 
in Austria) and 65 (men in Austria and both men and women in Germany) or older receive income 
from gainful employment. The coefficient for age is negative in both countries. This implies that the 
older a person gets, the less likely they are in employment. This is also confirmed in the literature. 
As described in section 5, these two continental European countries have both reformed their 
pension systems in order to be more sustainable for future demographic challenges. One crucial goal 
of these reforms was to increase the factual retirement age. As tables 6 and 7 show, both countries 
have made important progress in raising the labor market participation rates for older workers by 
implementing active and passive labor market policies. Comparing the effect sizes, it seems like age 
is a more important factor in Austria for receiving income from gainful employment in the last year 
than in Germany. In Austria, it is observable that with every year a person gets older, the odds of 
having income from gainful employment decrease by 16.2%. In Germany, the effect is a little weaker, 
with a decrease of only 11% per year of ageing.  
Additionally, the receipt of public pension benefits and having received income from employment 
in the last year are significantly negative correlated in Germany. This is not surprising, since one 
would assume that the receipt of pension benefits eases the need for additional income. The odds 
of having received income from gainful employment in the last year decrease by 59.1% with the 
receipt of public pension benefits. The effect size is still quite interesting, since, as stated in the 
literature review, the net replacement rate of Germany’s pay-as-you-go public pension scheme has 
been decreased rather drastically and its statutory retirement age has been raised (Bäcker 2018b). 
Since additional benefits from second and third pillar pensions cannot compensate the drastically 
lowered benefits from the public pillar (Blank et al. 2016b, Ebbinghaus 2018), staying in the labor 
market, I argued, might be a necessity one cannot avoid. This also goes against Hofäcker & Naumann 
(2015), who state a multitude of reasons for a trend towards late retirement in Germany. Apart from 
the obvious benefit retrenchment described above, late retirement might have to do with a longer 
disability-free life expectancy as well as structural economic change and the educational expansion 
(Hofäcker & Naumann 2015, 474).  
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In comparison to Germany in Austria, the receipt of a public pension and income from gainful 
employment do not correlate significantly. As the literature suggests, this might be because of the 
institutional difference to Germany. Austria and Germany have taken different paths in tackling 
pension reformation, in which Austria has stuck to a strong public pension pillar and Germany has 
chosen to move towards a multi-pillar system (Blank et al. 2016b). One explanation for the 
insignificant correlation between public pension benefits and employment beyond the retirement 
age might be that, as Hofäcker et al. (2019) point out correctly, the public pension net replacement 
rate of lifetime earnings is rather high compared to other European countries and especially 
compared to Germany. A prolonged working life might rather be a voluntary activity in retirement, 
than a necessity. Hofäcker et al. (2019) find evidence, that this is true especially for those with a high 
level of education.  
Furthermore, the whole SHARE sample gives more insight into the factors affecting employment in 
retirement age. The control variables for Germany and Austria show that the Austrian population is 
less likely to be employed in old age compared to the SHARE average. Germany shows a weaker 
negative coefficient. However, the coefficient is not significant. Looking at the strength of both 
coefficients, though, it is observable that Austrians are less likely to retire late than Germans. This 
finding is also confirmed in the literature for earlier waves of SHARE (Axelrad 2018, Börsch-Supan et 
al. 2009). Moreover, the regression analysis for the SHARE population shows a significantly negative 
coefficient for the receipt of public pension benefits for all SHARE countries. This implies that the 
odds for being in employment in old age decrease with the receipt of benefits from a public pension. 
On the contrary, the odds of being in employment increase with the receipt of occupational pension 
benefits and payments from a private life insurance.  
Whereas the variables for all levels of educational attainment have been insignificant for both 
Austria and Germany, they are significant in the SHARE sample. As suggested by previous studies, 
the odds for respondents to work in retirement age are highest for those with a high level of 
education (Hofäcker et al. 2016, Hofäcker & Naumann 2015, Scherger 2013). In contrast, they are 
the lowest for respondents with a low level of education in this study. Hofäcker et al. (2016) suggest 
that those with a high level of education stay in the labor market intrinsically, whereas the less 
educated retire involuntarily, for instance due to health reasons. Unfortunately, this cannot be 
confirmed for Germany and Austria individually. 
Even though the data on most of the variables in the regression models for both Germany and 
Austria are insignificant, I would still, with caution, argue, that there are differences in the need-
factors regarding employment in retirement age. The age of respondents in Austria has a stronger 
negative influence on having received income from employment in the last year than in Germany. 
According to the SHARE sample regression, the odds for Austrians to have income from employment 
are lower than for Germans. In addition, the results for educational attainment in the SHARE sample 
and in previous literature point towards being in employment is rather voluntary in Austria (Axelrad 
2018, Hofäcker & Naumann 2015, Scherger 2013). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 can only be partly 
confirmed and with caution. There is a tendency towards it being more necessary for Germans to 
prolong their working life than for Austrians. 
Unfortunately, Hypothesis 2 regarding significant differences in different sectors of employment 
cannot be answered. As a result of lacking observations, the variables on sectors of employment 
could not be included in the regression analysis. Nevertheless, the descriptive data for all samples 
show a clear tendency. In all 3 samples, the majority of workers claimed to work in the service sector 
(108 out of 177 in the SHARE sample and 16 out of 20 in Austria and Germany). Even though this 
could not be investigated properly, a tendency is observable. Wiß et al. (2019) and De Preter et al. 
(2012) also found that workers in the service sector retired the latest.  
At last, no statistical significance could be found for different levels of education in Austria and 
Germany. This might be due to the small sample size. The logistic regression analysis for the SHARE 
population suggests that the odds of having received income from gainful employment in the last 
year are higher the higher the level of education is. Although insignificant, this connection can also 
be observed in the regression models for each of the two countries. In chapter 2, I hypothesized that 
workers in Austria with a high level of education are more likely to retire after the statutory pension 
age than those with lower levels of education (Hypothesis 3). With caution, I confirm this hypothesis, 
since the significance of a high level of education is not only shown significantly in the SHARE 
population regression, but also previous studies (Hofäcker et al. 2016, Hofäcker & Naumann 2015, 
Scherger 2013). Furthermore, interpreting the insignificant coefficients in the Austrian sample, the 
same pattern is noticeable. Interestingly, Hypothesis 4, in which I hypothesize that workers with low 
and high rather than medium levels of education tend to work beyond retirement age, needs to be 
rejected. Although insignificant, the German sample shows the same pattern as the Austrian and 
SHARE population, indicating that those with low levels of education are the least likely to work 
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beyond the retirement age. Therefore, the argumentation of Hofäcker et al. (2016), who raise 
awareness of the least educated also usually having started to work earliest and thus being eligible 
for pension benefits rather early, can be confirmed in this analysis. 
  
9. CONCLUSION 
Germany and Austria, two continental, Bismarckian welfare regimes, are in a similar need to make 
their pension systems financially sustainable for the future. Both countries have been working 
towards keeping older workers aged 50+ in the labor market for as long as possible and guaranteeing 
the financial sustainability of their public pay-as-you-go pension schemes while cutting benefits, 
with different measures. With Germany having reformed its public pension system to be less 
generous and citizens receiving lower benefits, the question arises if those, who work beyond the 
statutory retirement age, work out of necessity or voluntarily. Furthermore, it is unclear which 
demographic characteristics those citizens have, who work beyond the retirement age in Germany 
and Austria.  
This study explored the role of pension benefits, individual (gender, education) and occupational 
(sector of employment) factors as well as how they influence the timing of retirement. Germany and 
Austria were compared using data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement (SHARE) wave 
7. SHARE provides the necessary tools to analyze all factors in depth and investigate links between 
those factors. Whereas there is a large body of literature on retirement timing, using the latest wave 
of SHARE allowed to investigate, if certain indicators of working in retirement changed throughout 
the last years. Specifically, the aim of this thesis was to look at Austria and Germany in depth and 
compare how the factors explained above affect employment of those aged 65 and older. Separate 
binary logistic regression models were created to highlight the importance of each factor affecting 
retirement timing in each country. Additionally, the regression models for both countries were 
compared with a similar regression model for all SHARE countries together. This comparison was 
carried out due to the very small sample sizes for the Austrian and German sample and to highlight 
that the independent variables are in fact an important indicator for or against having received 
income from gainful employment in old age.  
This study shows that age, above all, is a key characteristic when exploring income from employment 
in a population above the retirement age. Age is a significant predictor for having income from 
employment in older age for both Austria and Germany but has an even stronger effect in Austria. 
As previous literature has suggested, Austria still seems to be an early retirement country, where the 
receipt of public pension benefits does not affect the odds of being employed in later life. On the 
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contrary, the receipt of benefits from a public pension does affect income from employment in old 
age negatively.  
Furthermore, it is noticeable that a high level of education increases the odds of having received 
income from gainful employment in the last year in retirement age in both countries. The literature 
review in this thesis points towards differences in the explanations for this group to prolong their 
working life. It is suggested that those with higher levels of education in Germany work out of 
financial need, whereas Austrians work longer out of intrinsic reasons. The correlation seems linear: 
The higher the educational attainment, the more likely to work beyond the retirement age.  
With various scholars asking if social inequality in old age has increased since the turn of the 
millennium, this thesis aims at providing knowledge to support this process of finding out. This 
research, though, is limited in its explanatory power due to the small sample sizes in the regression 
models. Further research needs to focus more on the question, if funded pension schemes 
definitively contribute to a secure income in old age or if the gap between poor and rich increases. 
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  N Valid 461   
  Missing 0   
  Mean  74,76   
       
  Median 74,00   
       
  Std. Deviation 7,698   
       
  Skewness 0,359   
       
  Std. Error of Skewness 0,114   
       
  Kurtosis -0,482   
       
  Std. Error of Kurtosis 0,227   
       
  Minimum 60   
       
  Maximum 97   
  a. Country identifier = Austria   
Gender 
  N Valid 461   
  Missing 0   
  Mean 0,3601   
       
  Median 0,0000   
       
  Std. Deviation 0,48055   
       
  Skewness 0,585   
       
  Std. Error of Skewness 0,114   
       
  Kurtosis -1,665   
       
  Std. Error of Kurtosis 0,227   
       
  Minimum 0,00   
       
  Maximum 1,00   
  a. Country identifier = Austria   
Income 
  N Valid 461   
  Missing 2086   
  Mean 0,0629   
  
   
  
  Median 0,0000   
  
   
  
  Std. Deviation 0,24306   
  
   
  
  Skewness 3,612   
  
   
  
  Std. Error of Skewness 0,114   
  
   
  
  Kurtosis 11,097   
  
   
  
  Std. Error of Kurtosis 0,227   
  
   
  
  Minimum 0,00   
  
   
  
  Maximum 1,00   
  a. Country identifier = Austria   
 
Pensions and Life Insurane 
   
public occupational  private life insurance 
  
  N Valid 461 459 458 458   
  Missing 0 2 3 3   
  Mean 0,8243 0,0370 0,0087 0,0109   
          
  Median 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000   
          
  Std. Deviation 0,38098 0,18906 0,09315 0,10403   
          
  Skewness -1,710 4,919 10,595 9,444   
          
  Std. Error of Skewness 0,114 0,114 0,114 0,114   
          
  Kurtosis 0,928 22,294 110,727 87,577   
          
  Std. Error of Kurtosis 0,227 0,227 0,228 0,228   
          
  Minimum 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00   
          




  N Valid 348   
  Missing 113   








































  Maximum 4,00   
  a. Country identifier = Austria   
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Levels of Education 
   Low Mediuma High   
  N Valid 457 457 457   
  Missing 4 4 4   
  Mean 0,3151 0,4726 0,2123   
  
     
  
  Median 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000   
  
     
  
  Std. Deviation 0,46506 0,49980 0,40935   
  
     
  
  Skewness 0,799 0,110 1,412   
  
     
  
  Std. Error of Skewness 0,114 0,114 0,114   
  
     
  
  Kurtosis -1,368 -1,997 -0,006   
  
     
  
  Std. Error of Kurtosis 0,228 0,228 0,228   
  
     
  
  Minimum 0,00 0,00 0,00   
  
     
  





  N Valid 676   
  Missing 0   
  Mean 73,94   
       
  Median 73,00   
       
  Std. Deviation 6,661   
       
  Skewness 0,633   
       
  Std. Error of Skewness 0,094   
       
  Kurtosis -0,183   
       
  Std. Error of Kurtosis 0,188   
       
  Minimum 65   
       
  Maximum 96   













  N Valid 676   
  Missing 0   
  Mean 0,4941   
  
  
   
  Median 0,0000   
  
  
   
  Std. Deviation 0,50034   
  
  
   
  Skewness 0,024   
  
  
   
  Std. Error of Skewness 0,094   
  
  
   
  Kurtosis -2,005   
  
  
   
  Std. Error of Kurtosis 0,188   
  
  
   
  Minimum 0,00   
  
  
   
  Maximum 1,00   
  a. Country identifier = Germany   
  Consumption   
  N Valid 472   
  Missing 204   








































  Maximum 4,00   
  a. Country identifier = Germany   
  Income   
  N Valid 676   
  Missing 1564   








































  Maximum 1,00   




Pensions and Life Insurance 
   
public occupational private life insurance 
  
  N Valid 673 674 675 675   
  Missing 3 2 1 1   
  Mean 0,9643 0,2789 0,0341 0,0296   
  
      
  
  Median 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000   
  
      
  
  Std. Deviation 0,18558 0,44881 0,18155 0,16969   
  
      
  
  Skewness -5,019 0,988 5,148 5,560   
  
      
  
  Std. Error of Skewness 0,094 0,094 0,094 0,094   
  
      
  
  Kurtosis 23,260 -1,027 24,574 29,004   
  
      
  
  Std. Error of Kurtosis 0,188 0,188 0,188 0,188   
  
      
  
  Minimum 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00   
  
      
  
  Maximum 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00   
 
Levels of Education 
   Low Medium High   
  
N Valid 673 673 673   
  Missing 3 3 3   
  Mean 0,1040 0,5513 0,3447   
  
     
  
  Median 0,0000 1,0000 0,0000   
  
     
  
  Std. Deviation 0,30550 0,49774 0,47563   
  
     
  
  Skewness 2,600 -0,207 0,655   
  
     
  
  Std. Error of Skewness 0,094 0,094 0,094   
  
     
  
  Kurtosis 4,775 -1,963 -1,576   
  
     
  
  Std. Error of Kurtosis 0,188 0,188 0,188   
  
     
  
  Minimum 0,00 0,00 0,00   
  
     
  
  Maximum 1,00 1,00 1,00   
SHARE 
Pensions and Life Insurance 
   
public occupational private life insurance 
  
  N Valid 11052 10270 10990 10990   
  Missing 31 813 93 93   
  Mean 0,7914 0,1415 0,0401 0,0129   
          
  Median 1,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000   
          
  Std. Deviation 0,40630 0,34853 0,19627 0,11294   
          
  Skewness -1,435 2,058 4,687 8,627   
          
  Std. Error of Skewness 0,023 0,024 0,023 0,023   
          
  Kurtosis 0,059 2,235 19,972 72,441   
          
  Std. Error of Kurtosis 0,047 0,048 0,047 0,047   
          
  Minimum 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00   
          
  Maximum 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00   
 
Age 
  N Valid 11083   
  Missing 0   
  Mean 74,98   
       
  Median 74,00   
       
  Std. Deviation 7,244   
       
  Skewness 0,614   
       
  Std. Error of Skewness 0,023   
       
  Kurtosis -0,372   
       
  Std. Error of Kurtosis 0,047   
       
  Minimum 65   
       





  N Valid 7799   
  Missing 3284   
  Mean 2,8860   
       
  Median 3,0000   
       
  Std. Deviation 1,05076   
       
  Skewness -0,430   
       
  Std. Error of Skewness 0,028   
       
  Kurtosis -1,088   
       
  Std. Error of Kurtosis 0,055   
       
  Minimum 1,00   
       









  N Valid 11083   
  Missing 34846   
  Mean 0,0903   
  
   
  
  Median 0,0000   
  
   
  
  Std. Deviation 0,28665   
  
   
  
  Skewness 2,859   
  
   
  
  Std. Error of Skewness 0,023   
  
   
  
  Kurtosis 6,175   
  
   
  
  Std. Error of Kurtosis 0,047   
  
   
  
  Minimum 0,00   
  
   
  




Austria and Germany 
   Austria Germany   
  N Valid 11083 11083   
  Missing 0 0   
  Mean 0,0384 0,0610   
  
    
  
  Median 0,0000 0,0000   
  
    
  
  Std. Deviation 0,19226 0,23933   
  
    
  
  Skewness 4,802 3,669   
  
    
  
  Std. Error of Skewness 0,023 0,023   
  
    
  
  Kurtosis 21,066 11,466   
  
    
  
  Std. Error of Kurtosis 0,047 0,047   
  
    
  
  Minimum 0,00 0,00   
  
    
  
  Maximum 1,00 1,00   
Gender 
  N Valid 11083   
  Missing 0   
  Mean 0,4438   
       
  Median 0,0000   
       
  Std. Deviation 0,49686   
       
  Skewness 0,226   
       
  Std. Error of Skewness 0,023   
       
  Kurtosis -1,949   
       
  Std. Error of Kurtosis 0,047   
       
  Minimum 0,00   
       
  Maximum 1,00   
Levels of Education 
   Low Medium High   
  N Valid 10468 10468 10468   
  Missing 615 615 615   
  Mean 0,4663 0,3285 0,2052   
  
     
  
  Median 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000   
  
     
  
  Std. Deviation 0,49889 0,46970 0,40386   
  
     
  
  Skewness 0,135 0,730 1,460   
  
     
  
  Std. Error of Skewness 0,024 0,024 0,024   
  
     
  
  Kurtosis -1,982 -1,467 0,132   
  
     
  
  Std. Error of Kurtosis 0,048 0,048 0,048   
  
     
  
  Minimum 0,00 0,00 0,00   
  
     
  





2. SPSS Syntax 
**income from employment last year 
recode ep204_ (-2 thru -1=sysmis) (1=1) (5=0) INTO ep204_rec. 
variable labels ep204_rec 'income from dependent employment last year'. 




recode ep206_ (-2 thru -1=sysmis) (1=1) (5=0) INTO ep206_rec. 
variable labels ep206_rec 'income from independent employment last year'. 





recode allincome (2 thru hi=1). 
value labels allincome 
0 'no income' 
1 'income'. 
 
**education grouped - three groups 
recode isced1997_r (1 thru 2=1) (3 thru 4=2) (5 thru 6=3) (else=sysmis) into education. 
variable labels education 'education grouped'. 
value labels education 
1 'low level of education' 
2 'medium level of education' 






**is household able to make ends meet 
recode co007_ (-2 thru -1=sysmis) (else=COPY) into consumption.  
VARIABLE LABELS consumption 'is household able to make ends meet'. 
value labels consumption 
1 'with great difficulty' 
2 'with some difficulty' 
3 'fairly easily' 
4 'easily'. 
recode co007_ (1=1) (2 thru 4=0) (else=sysmis) into co007_greatdiff. 
VARIABLE LABELS co007_greatdiff 'household able to make ends meet with great difficulty'. 




recode co007_ (1=0) (2=1) (3 thru 4=0) (else=sysmis) into co007_somediff. 
VARIABLE LABELS co007_somediff 'household able to make ends meet with some difficulty'. 






recode co007_ (1 thru 2=0) (3=1) (4=0) (else=sysmis) into co007_fairlyeasily. 
VARIABLE LABELS co007_fairlyeasily 'household able to make ends meet fairly easily'. 




recode co007_ (4=1) (1 thru 3=0) (else=sysmis) into co007_easily. 
VARIABLE LABELS co007_easily 'household able to make ends meet easily'. 






recode gender (2=0) (1=1) (else=sysmis) into gender_dummy. 
variable labels gender_dummy 'gender (1=male)'. 





**public pension recoded 
recode ep671d1 (0=0) (1=1) (else=sysmis) into public_pension. 
value labels public_pension 
1 'receipt' 
0 'no receipt'. 
 
recode ep624_ (5=0) (1=1) (else = sysmis) into occup_pensions. 
value labels occup_pensions 
1 'receipt' 
0 'no receipt'. 
 
**private pensions recoded 
recode ep089d2 (0=0) (1=1) (else = sysmis) into private_pensions. 
value labels private_pensions 
1 'receipt' 
0 'no receipt'. 
 
**life insurance recoded 
recode ep089d1 (0=0) (1=1) (else = sysmis) into life_insurance. 
value labels life_insurance 
1 'receipt' 
0 'no receipt'. 
 
** sectors of employment - need to leave out 
recode ep018_ (-2 thru -1=sysmis) (1=1) (3=6) (11 thru 14=5) (7=5) (2=2) (4 thru 5=2) (6=3) (8=3) (9 
thru 10=4) into ep018_rec. 
variable labels ep018_rec 'sector of employment working in now grouped'. 












**FILTERS for Austria AND Germany sample, later extra filter for each country; filters need to be on 
always 
COMPUTE men65=(gender = 1) & (age_int >= 65). 
EXECUTE. 
COMPUTE women60=(gender = 2) & (age_int >= 60) & (country=11). 
EXECUTE. 
COMPUTE women65=(gender = 2) & (age_int >= 65) & (country=12). 
EXECUTE. 
SELECT IF (men65=1) or (women65=1) or (women60=1). 
SELECT IF (country=11) or (country=12). 
SELECT IF (allincome=0) or (allincome=1). 
 
**filter for Austria - activate filter needed, if filter not needed anymore type “filter off.” 
USE ALL. 
COMPUTE filter_$=(country=11). 
VARIABLE LABELS filter_$ 'country=11 (FILTER)'. 
VALUE LABELS filter_$ 0 'Not Selected' 1 'Selected'. 
FORMATS filter_$ (f1.0). 
FILTER BY filter_$. 
EXECUTE. 
 
**filter for Germany - activate filter needed, if filter not needed anymore type “filter off.” 
USE ALL. 
COMPUTE filter_$=(country=12). 
VARIABLE LABELS filter_$ 'country=12 (FILTER)'. 
VALUE LABELS filter_$ 0 'Not Selected' 1 'Selected'. 
FORMATS filter_$ (f1.0). 
FILTER BY filter_$. 
EXECUTE. 
 
**Regression Austria – activate filter for Austria 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES allincome 
  /METHOD=ENTER education gender_dummy age_int public_pension 
  /CONTRAST (education)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (gender_dummy)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (public_pension)=Indicator(1) 
  /PRINT=ITER(1) CI(95) 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5). 
 
**Regression Germany - activate filter for Germany 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES allincome 
  /METHOD=ENTER education gender_dummy public_pension occup_pensions age_int 
private_pensions life_insurance 
  /CONTRAST (education)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (gender_dummy)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (public_pension)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (private_pensions)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (occup_pensions)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (life_insurance)=Indicator(1) 
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  /PRINT=ITER(1) CI(95) 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5). 
 
**Regression SHARE with extra filter, without previous filters 
COMPUTE men65=(gender = 1) & (age_int >= 65). 
COMPUTE women65=(gender = 2) & (age_int >= 65). 
EXECUTE. 
SELECT IF (men65=1) or (women65=1). 
compute austria= country=11. 
compute germany= country=12. 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES allincome 
  /METHOD=ENTER austria germany age_int education gender_dummy co007_greatdiff 
co007_somediff co007_fairlyeasily co007_easily public_pension occup_pensions private_pensions 
life_insurance  
  /CONTRAST (education)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (gender_dummy)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (public_pension)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (occup_pensions)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (life_insurance)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (private_pensions)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (co007_greatdiff)=Indicator(1)  
  /CONTRAST (co007_somediff)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (co007_fairlyeasily)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (co007_easily)=Indicator(1) 
  /PRINT=ITER(1) CI(95) 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(0.05) POUT(0.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(0.5). 
